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This paper assesses the main argument of Thomas Nagel's recent book, Mind and 
Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly 
False. The paper agrees with Nagel that, as an approach to the relation between mind and 
matter and the mystery of subjective experience, neutral monism is more likely to be true 
than either materialism or idealism. It disagrees with Nagel by favoring a version of 
neutral monism based on emergence rather than on a reductive pan-psychism. However, 
the paper invokes a reductive view when applied to information (as opposed to psyche), 
and posits a hierarchy of types of information that span the domains of matter, life, and 
mind. Subjective experience is emergent, but also continuous with informational 
phenomena at lower levels. 
Key words: reductionism, mind-body problem, subjective experience, emergence, 
autopoiesis, information, pan-psychism, neutral monism, materialism 
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Nagel's argument 
Thomas Nagel in Mind & Cosmos (2002) asserts that psychophysical reduction 
explaining mind in terms of matter - has been and will forever be a failure, and that 
therefore "the materialist theory of evolution is almost certainly wrong." "Mind" here 
refers to consciousness; more precisely, to subjective experience. Nagel briefly reviews 
various approaches that have been taken towards the relation of mind to matter (Table 1 ). 
He rejects the currently dominant approach of materialism and favors the alternative of 
neutral monism; specifically, its reductive - as opposed to emergent- version. Nagel 
thinks that materialist neo-Darwinism is also unable to explain rationality or justify value 
realism, but these extensions of his argument will not be considered here. 
Table 1. Points of view about mind and matter 
Th d h . . J' N I' fi d . h e ommant view JS s own m 1ta 1cs; age s ore erre view JS s own m b Id 0 
Dualism substance or attribute dualism 
Monism materialism reductionism (eliminative or identity-theory) 
idealism theism, absolute idealism, subjective idealism 
neutral monism reductive ( pan-psychism) 
emergent 
While opposing materialism, Nagel also rejects idealism, its traditional alternative, which 
either invokes God as an ultimate mental reality (theism), takes ideas as more real than 
matter (absolute idealism), or grounds reality in human experience (logical positivism, 
phenomenology, constructivism). Idealism is rejected out of hand; Nagel concerns 
himself only with arguing for the inadequacy of materialism, specifically materialist neo-
Darwinism (MND), for explaining consciousness. Nagel insists that this inadequacy is 
not a 'local' failure. Human (and animal) subjective experience is a salient manifestation 
of life, and failure to explain such experience is not a minor flaw. Nagel argues that since 
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extension of scientific theory to encompass consciousness will require radical change, 
current theory must be "false." His objections to MND go even further. Aside from the' 
problem of subjective experience, he doubts that evolutionary theory adequately explains 
the history - especially the origins - of life even in its simplest forms, where subjectivity 
is usually assumed to be absent. While this objection to evolutionary theory is a 
supplementary argument not dependent on Nage]'s primary thesis,. it is clear that Nagel's 
doubts about the adequacy ofMND to account for the origin of life reinforces his doubts 
about its adequacy to encompass mind. 
Rejecting both extremes of materialism and idealism, Nagel advocates neutral monism, 
and, between its reductive and emergent varieties, prefers the former. In reductive 
monism - different from materialist reductionism entities have both material and 
mental properties. Mental properties are only discernable in certain complex entities, but 
along with physical properties, they go 'all the way down.' Reductive monism implies 
pan-psychism. In emergent neutral monism, by contrast, psychic properties only emerge 
at a certain level, being altogether absent at lower levels. 
For Nagel, reductive and emergent monism each has its appeal, but each also has 
weaknesses. The weaknesses of reductive monism are that it attributes to simple entities 
psychic properties that so far are unobservable, that it is hard to conceptualize whole-part 
relationships involving mental properties, and that it seems to require not only mind but 
also life to go all the way down, a vfolation of Okham's principle of parsimony. The 
weakness of emergent neutral monism is that the sudden appearance of psyche without 
precursors appears magical. 
Nagel's analyses include a synchronic "constitutive" mode of explanation and a 
diachronic "historical" mode, the completeness of explanation of any phenomenon 
requiring both modes. This explanatory dyad can be expanded into a structure-function-
history triad (Gerard 1958), where structure refers to the internal order of a system, 
function to its participation in an external order, and history to qualitative change in both 
internal and external orders. In terms of this triad, constitutive analysis of mind includes 
its relation to brain (structure) and to behavior, language, and social c9mmunication 
(function), while historical analysis takes up the origin of mind and its evolutionary 
development. Note that 'function' in this triad is different than 'function' in functionalist 
theories of mind. In the structure-function-history triad, 'function' means external as 
opposed to internal; in functionalist explanations of mind, 'function' refers to form as 
opposed to substance. 
Response to Nagel 
Emergent novelty need not be i"educible 
What follows is a brief for subjective experience as an emergent phenomenon, but one 
resembling other informational phenomena that occur in living systems. In Nagel's 
terminology, this posits an emergent neutral monism, augmented by a reductive view. In 
this view, mind is both different from and similar to what evolutionarily preceded it. 
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Difference, i.e., newness, manifests emergence, while similarity, i.e., continuity with 
antecedents, supports the reductive view. 
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Nagel favors the reductive view because he thinks it unlikely that a completely new 
property can emerge without being present at lower levels. This assumption, that the 
properties of a whole must also be properties of its parts, is a "fallacy of decomposition." 
A hydrogen molecule has vibrational modes of oscillation, but its constituent atoms do 
not. Water has fluidity, but individual water molecules, and their hydrogen and oxygen 
atoms, and their protons, neutrons, and electrons, and their quarks and leptons do not. 
There is nothing mysterious about the emergence of a property at some level, despite its 
complete absence at lower levels. Such emergence is ubiquitous. 
The emergence of new properties in ·complex systems does not, however, mean that the 
whole is irreducible. While emergence is often defined as the appearance of wholes 
having irreducible novel properties, novelty and irreducibility do not need to be linked. 
Indeed, Anderson (1972) sees emergence and reduction as two sides of one coin, the 
difference being that emergence is what we see when we look up from the lower level to 
the higher one, while reduction is what we see when we look down from the higher level 
to the lower one. Emergence does mean that a whole is irreducible to its parts, but it does 
not require that the whole is irreducible to parts plus relations between parts, plus 
relations of whole and parts to the context in which they're embedded. 
The distinction between novel properties that are or are not reducible is the difference 
between "strong" and "weak" emergence. Nagel acknowledges this difference when he 
speaks of "harmless" (weak) emergence, but seems to assume that an explanation of mind 
via emergence requires the harmful (strong) variety. It is not clear why this should be so. 
Even strong emergence should not be objectionable if one can explain why reduction of 
emergent properties to lower level description is impossible. For example, it might be 
impossible because of mathematical undecidability or computational complexity or 
spontaneous symmetry breaking, or for other reasons. The often vacuous notion of 
"supervenience," where novel upper level phenomena are said to depend upon but are 
still not reducible to lower level phenomena, might in this way be given some content. 
Life and mind are emergent but not purely materialist 
There is at least one reason to believe that an explanation of subjective experience is 
possible, even though we don't have such an explanation now and don't know where to 
look. The reason is the precedent of the scientific explanation of life. If, provisionally, 
we hypothesize that life emerged from matter and mind emerged from life, and consider 
only the constitutive question and not also the historical one, we note that both instances 
of emergence were once mysterious, but now only the mystery of mind remains. The 
solution of the first mystery suggests that solution of the second mystery is conceivable. 
Although our understanding of life does not itself yield an understanding of mind, it calls 
attention to the fact that life is.not a purely materialist phenomenon; the same might be 
true for mind. We understand life as a phenomenon in which organizational separation 
from an environment allows self-construction and repair .("autopoiesis"), using imported 
matter and energy processed by metabolism that is specified by internal information, 
Is the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature False? (Zwick) 5 
where this information also governs boundary creation, reproduction, and adaptation to 
the environment, and where populations of such systems undergo evolutionary change. 
These multiple aspects of life are fairly well understood, and few if any scientists would 
say that we need a reductive theory that attributes proto-life features to the constituents of 
living systems, to the constituents of these constituents, and so on. Even if one allows, 
for the sake of argument, that some constituents (or their precursors, e.g., ribozymes) 
exhibit proto-life, one could not make this attribution for constituents even one level 
down, since nucleotides or amino acids are not living in any sense of the word. Biology 
offers no support to a reductive pan-life position. Life does not go all the way down. 
Those who think otherwise typically confuse energy or dynamics with life. If life i~ 
emergent, it seems reasonable to expect that mind is as well. It is hard to imagine that 
mind has a reductive explanation and goes all the way down, while life does not. 
But Nagel does not accept life as emergent, because a constitutive explanation of life 
does not answer the historical question of how life appeared. Nagel takes the absence of 
an account of origins as undermining not only our historical understanding but also the 
constitutive explanation. This is unreasonable. Origins are always difficult to explain. 
The origins of the universe or its galaxies or the solar system or its planets are obscure, 
but this does not completely prevent understanding of diachronic change, nor does it put 
in doubt our knowledge of the synchronic structure and function of these entities. The 
absence of an account of origins does not undermine historical explanation, and the 
incompleteness of historical explanation does not invalidate constitutive explanation. (It 
should be mentioned that Nagel is also unimpressed by evolutionary knowledge about 
life after it originated, so it is not only the absence of an account of origins that he thinks 
flaws our historical explanation.) 
The solution available to the constitutive problem of life suggests that the constitutive 
problem of mind might be solvable, and that the solution may not be purely materialist, 
since the constitutive conception of life is not purely materialist. Nagel's characterization 
of neo-Darwinism as materialistic is incorrect, however conventional it is. Life is based 
not merely on a particular materiality, but on certain forms and processes. Autopoiesis, 
replication, adaptation, and evolution can all be conceptualized without reference to any 
specific materiality. This is the core insight of the field of "artificial life" (Langton 
1997). In Bunge' s (1973) terms, the properties defining life are "stuff-free." They are 
capable in principle of realization via different forms of matter, although the instantiation 
of these properties on Earth in fact requires organic molecules. Even if life everywhere 
(assuming it also exists elsewhere) requires this materiality, it would still be a mistake to 
regard the phenomenon of life as purely materialist, since these signature properties are 
formal, not material. Autonomy depends on the self-reference of autopoiesis (Maturana 
& Varela 1980), and self-reference is not a material property. The principles of evolution 
are formal, not material, as the genetic algorithm illustrates. Understanding life requires 
ideas of information to explain genetic determination, positive and negative feedback to 
explain biological control, and utility and fitness to explain agency and evolution. Unlike 
matter and energy, information and utility have no physical units. A theory that invokes 
properties that have no physical units is not purely materialist. Of course, information 
and utility must be instantiated, so their role in life, while not purely materialist, is not 
idealist either (certainly not idealist in the senses of Table 1 ). Matter and form are joined 
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together, as Aristotle held. But Plato was also right, not necessarily in his idealism, but 
because his "vertical" separation of matter and form captures the fact that biological 
information occurs in various degrees of refinement, distillation, and concentration. 
But abandonment of reductionist materialism, while necessary, is still not sufficfont to 
explain subjective experience. There are numerous conceptions of mind that are formal, 
as opposed to material. Dennett (1991) joins a functional account of mind to eliminative 
materialism; Tononi (2008) offers a pan-psychic view based in information theory that 
echoes a proposal by Chalmers (1996) and is in the spirit ofNagel's reductive neutral 
monism; and there are other functional, informational, or computational conceptions of 
mind. But the mystery of subjective experience remains unsolved by these non-material 
approaches. 
Mind is one of several instances of informational emergence 
While the formal approach to life doesn't solve the mystery of mind, it does suggest a 
way to retain a modified reductive viewpoint. One can regard subjective experience as an 
emergent novelty, but see this emergence as continuous with other informational aspects 
ofliving and even non-living matter. This continuity could be described in terms of a 
hierarchy of levels of information, as shown in Table 2. This hierarchy is introduced to 
convey two ideas: (1) that types of information can be defined as going from general to 
specialized, encompassing the domains of matter, life, and mind, and (2) that subjective 
experience is a specialized process that occurs only at the highest levels of the hierarchy. 
Table 2. Levels of information 
The list of system types is borrowed (with slight modification) from Boulding (1956) 
SYSTEM TYPE INFORMATION PHENOMENON 
(vii) humans neurological self-awareness ~Ht. (vi) animals neurological experience mind 
(v) genetic-societal level (e.g., plants) meta-genetic differentiation 
(iv) cells genetic reproduction life 
(iii) autopoietic systems network production 
(ii) control mechanisms (e.g., thermostat) control regulation 
(h) clockworks (dynamic systems) algorithmic organization 
(i1) frameworks (static systems) form organization matter 
In this hierarchy, each level is both similar to and different from adjacent levels. 
Emergent neutral monism is reflected in the differences, and reductive neutral monism is 
reflected in the similarities. Subjective experience emerges at level (vi), and level (vii) 
represents its fuller development in consciousness. These two levels are genuinely new, 
but they are also a variation on informational phenomena occurring at lower levels. The 
reductive view is correct as applied to pan-information, but not to pan-psychism. 
Information goes all the way down, but psyche, i.e., subjective experience, does not. 
Psyche emerges. 
The lowest level of the table shows information in its most general manifestation (ii), 
namely "form," measured in information theory by Shannon entropy (Shannon & Weaver 
1949), and the dynamic version of information (h) developed in algorithmic information 
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theory ofKolmogorov (1965) and Chaitin (1975). Level (ii), information occurs in 
control systems, where it is concentrated and explicit. At level (iii), self-constructing but 
non-living systems (e.g., flames, eddies, tornadoes, which are autopoietic in a narrow 
sense) depend on a network of interactions that construct and maintain the internal order 
of the system. At these three levels, information is analog. In cells, genetic information 
at level (iv) governs metabolic autopoiesis and enables reproduction and adaptation. 
Here for the first time, information is digital, and here reproduction produces populations 
that have history, i.e., undergo evolution, which, contra Varela and Maturana, is an 
essential aspect of life. In the dynamics of cellular metabolism, enzymes are (analog) 
informational catalysts at level (h) that are specified by the (digital) genetic information 
at level (iv). Cells also include feedback control mechanisms, assigned here to level (ii). 
In multi-cellular plants and simple animals, there is the meta-level control (v) of genetic 
information by chemical messengers. Finally, at some point in the animal kingdom, one 
has complex neural systems (vi), that allow the emergence of subjective experience, and 
in higher animals (vii), self-awareness. Table 2 is just a crude sketch. One might wish to 
interpose between (vi) and (vii) a level for simple neurological systems that are sub-
experiential, or add a top level (viii) that includes socio-cultural (language) phenomena. 
This view of mind, which combines emergent neutral monism with a modified reductive 
view, might be called "continuous emergence," where "continuous" is intended to have 
two meanings. It points to emergent phenomena that resemble lower level informational 
phenomena, and it suggests the repeated occurrence of emergence resulting in a hierarchy 
of levels, each both similar to and different from the level below. · 
Identifying the sense in which the reductive view is correct, namely the informational 
character of subjective experience, does not actually explain the emergence of level (vi) 
from level (v). It merely acknowledges that in emergence there is also continuity. It does 
argue, however, against taking lower level explanations as fully adequate for higher level 
phenomena, i.e., it rejects "systems-theoretic reductionism," which is not an oxymoron. 
Reductionism of any kind explains phenomena in terms of something "fundamental." In 
materialist reductionism, the fundamental is what is materially elemental; in systems-
theoretic reductionism, the fundamental is what is most general, i.e., level (i) in Table 2. 
Systems-theoretic reductionism is illustrated by Wolfram's (2002) argument that virtually 
everything dynamic can be modeled by cellular automata; among mind-matter 
explanations, it is exemplified by Tononi's (2008) proposal that consciousness is 
"integrative" (holistic) information processing. But this argument against the sufficiency 
of reductionist explanations does not deny their importance or necessity. 
The levels of Table 2 do not reflect a simple historical account, being more like a list of 
levels of "(informational) being," but in so far as the instantiation of information in 
matter, life, and mind appeared sequentially in history, the table raises the question of 
teleology: is there, as Teilhard de Chardin (1959) thought, a tendency in cosmological 
evolution towards the distillation, refinement, and concentration of information? Nagel 
also asks us to consider the possibility of teleological laws that supplement causal laws, 
though it is unclear why additional laws are need if one posits ar ample version of the 
Anthropic Principle. But these questions are beyond the scope of this paper to engage. 
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Summary 
Continuous emergence advocates an neutral monism that takes subjective experience to 
be absent in simpler systems. The emergence of such experience, however, is one of 
several emergent informational phenomena, that range over the domains of matter, life, 
and mind. In Nagel's terms, a neutral monism based in emergence can be augmented by 
a reductive pan-information, but not pan-psychic, view. But this dual emergent-reductive 
framework does not solve the mystery of subjective experience, as it does not answer 
either the constitutive question of mind or the historical one. 
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